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Abstract
We introduce an eﬃcient solution for games with communication graph structures and
show that it is characterized by eﬃciency, fairness and a new axiom called component
balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication
graph the total payoﬀ to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoﬀ
of these players when applying the solution to the subgame induced by this component.
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1 Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being
a pair consisting of a finite set of players and a characteristic function on the collection
of all coalitions of players, that assigns a worth to each coalition of players. In this note
we consider TU-games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected
communication graph, as introduced by Myerson [7]. The nodes in the graph represent
the players and the edges represent the communication links between the players. Players
can only cooperate if they are connected. This yields a so-called (communication) graph
game, given by a triple consisting of a finite set of players, a characteristic function and a
communication graph.
A (single-valued) solution for communication graph games is a mapping that assigns
to every communication graph game a payoﬀ vector. The best-known solution for commu-
nication graph games is the Myerson value [7], which is obtained as the Shapley value of
a restricted game, and is characterized by component eﬃciency and fairness. Component
eﬃciency states that for each component of the communication graph the total payoﬀ to
the players of the component is equal to the worth of that component in the characteristic
function. Fairness says that deleting a link between two players yields for both players
the same change in payoﬀ. Another single-valued solution concept, the so-called position
value, is introduced in Meessen [6] and developed in Borm, Owen and Tijs [1]. Slikker [10]
axiomatizes the position value using component eﬃciency and balanced total threats. For
cycle-free communication graph games, Herings, van der Laan and Talman [4] introduced
the so-called Average Tree solution, characterized by component eﬃciency and component
fairness, the latter axiom stating that deleting a link between two players in a cycle-free
graph game yields the same average change in payoﬀ in the two components that result
from deleting the link. All these solutions satisfy component eﬃciency. Therefore, eﬃ-
ciency is only guaranteed when the graph is connected and thus contains the player set
itself as its unique component.
In contrast to the reasoning that a set of players can only realise its worth when
they are connected, and thus eventually the players in each component distribute the
worth of that component among each other, in some situations eﬃciency is obtained, even
when the communication graph is not connected. As an example, consider a research fund
that has an amount of money available to distribute amongst individual researchers. Every
researcher that submits a proposal takes part in the distribution of the available budget, so
writing an individual proposal is the only requirement for a researcher to get access to the
fund. However, the board of the research fund has the policy to stimulate interdisciplinary
research and therefore joint proposals get priority. Researchers can secure some part of the
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fund by submitting joint proposals. For instance, suppose that the budget of the fund is
12 and there are three researchers, named A, B and C. An individual proposal just gives
access to the fund, but does not secure any amount of money. On the other hand, A en
B can secure themselves a grant of 3 when writing a joint proposal, A and C a grant of 2
and B and C a grant of 4. However, C does not communicate with the others, so the only
feasible coalition is A and B and the communication graph consists of two components:
the coalition of A and B that can secure themselves 3, and the singleton agent C that can
only secure itself 0. According to the Myerson value the total amount of money granted
to the researchers is only 3, but in this situation the board of the research fund will grant
3 to A and B and will then distribute the remaining 9 to the researchers. Although the
communication graph is not connected, the full budget of 12 is still available to the coalition
of all players. So, this requires a value satisfying eﬃciency.
Recently, also Casajus [2] argued by some motivating example that in some situa-
tions it seems reasonable to require eﬃciency, even when the communication graph is not
connected and thus has multiple components. He introduced a solution for communication
graph games that is characterized by eﬃciency, equivalence (meaning that the total payoﬀ
in case of the complete graph is equal to the total payoﬀ in case of the empty graph), com-
ponent merging (meaning that merging the components’ players into a single player does
not aﬀect the total payoﬀ to the component) and a modified version of Myerson’s fairness.
In this note we introduce a new solution for communication graph games that, besides
eﬃciency and Myerson’s fairness, satisfies a new axiom called component balancedness.
This component balancedness axiom compares for every component in the communication
graph the total payoﬀ to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoﬀ
of this component when applying the solution to the subgame induced by this component.
It also can be seen as weak version of component eﬃciency. The new solution equals the
Shapley value when the graph is connected and is equal to the equal surplus division when
the graph is empty.
This note is organized as follows. Basic definitions and notation are introduced in
Section 2. The component balancedness axiom, the new solution and its characterization
are given in Section 3. At the end of that section we return to the research fund example
described above and compare our solution with several others.
2 Preliminaries
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperating can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a
pair h i, where  ⊂ IN is a finite set of  ≥ 2 players and : 2 → IR is a characteristic
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function on such that (∅) = 0. For any coalition  ⊆  , () is the worth of coalition ,
i.e., the members of coalition  can obtain a total payoﬀ of () by agreeing to cooperate.
We denote the set of all characteristic functions on given player set  by G .
Although is not fixed, nevertheless for simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears,
we write  instead of h i. For given  , the subgame of a game  ∈ G with respect to a
player set  ⊂  ,  6= ∅, is the game  ∈ G defined as  () = (), for all  ⊆  . We
denote the cardinality of a given set  by ||, along with lower case letters like  = | |,
 = ||, 0 = | 0| and so on. For  ⊂ IN, we denote IRK as the -dimensional vector space
which elements  ∈ IRK have components ,  ∈ .
For game  ∈ G , a vector  ∈ IR may be considered as a payoﬀ vector assigning
a payoﬀ  to each player  ∈  . A single-valued solution, called a value, is a mapping 
that assigns for every  and every  ∈ G a payoﬀ vector () ∈ IR . A value  is eﬃcient
if
P
∈ () = () for every  ∈ G and  ⊂ IN. The best-known eﬃcient value is the
Shapley value [9], given by
() =
X
{⊆ |∈}
(− )!(− 1)!
! (()− ( \ {})) for all  ∈ 
For  ⊂ IN, a communication structure on  is specified by a communication graph
hΓi with Γ ⊆ Γ = { { } |   ∈   6= }, i.e., Γ is a collection of (unordered) pairs of
nodes (players), where a pair { } represents a link between players   ∈  , and hΓi
is the complete graph on  . Again, for simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears,
we write graph Γ instead of hΓi. Let L denote the set of all communication graphs on
 . A pair hΓi ∈ G × L constitutes a game with (communication) graph structure or
simply a graph game on  . For given  , the subgraph of a graph Γ ∈ L with respect to
set  ⊆  ,  6= ∅, is the graph Γ| ∈ L defined by Γ| = {{ } ∈ Γ |   ∈ }.
For a graph Γ, a sequence of diﬀerent nodes (1     ),  ≥ 2, is a path from 1 to
, if for all  = 1     −1, { +1} ∈ Γ. A graph Γ on a player set  is connected, if for
any two nodes in  there exists a path in Γ from one node to the other. For given graph
Γ on  , we say that the player set  ⊆  is connected, if the subgraph Γ| is connected.
For graph Γ on player set  and  ⊆  , a subset  ⊆  is a component of  if (i) Γ|
is connected, and (ii) for every  ∈  \  , the subgraph Γ|∪{} is not connected. For Γ
on  and  ⊆  , we denote by Γ the set of all components of , and by (Γ) the
component of  containing  ∈ . Notice that Γ is a partition of .
A single-valued solution for communication graph games, a graph game value, is
a mapping  that for every  ⊂ IN and every hΓi ∈ G×L assigns a payoﬀ vector
(Γ) ∈ IR . A well-known graph game value is the Myerson value. In Myerson [7] it is
assumed that in a communication graph game hΓi only connected coalitions are able to
cooperate and to realise their worths. A non-connected coalition  can only realise the sum
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of the worths of its components in Γ. This yields the restricted game Γ∈G defined by
Γ() = X
∈Γ
( ) for all  ⊆ 
Then the Myerson value for communication graph games is the graph game value  that
assigns to every communication graph game hΓi the Shapley value of its restricted game
Γ, i.e.,
(Γ) = (Γ) for all hΓi ∈ G×L and every  ⊂ IN
It is well-known that the Myerson value is the unique graph game value that is component
eﬃcient and satisfies the so-called Myerson fairness axiom. The aim of this paper is to
introduce an eﬃcient and fair solution for communication graph games.
To conclude the introduction section we recall definitions of eﬃciency, component
eﬃciency and fairness. A graph game value  is
- eﬃcient if for every graph game hΓi on any player set  , P∈ (Γ) = ();
- component eﬃcient if for every graph game hΓi on any player set  , for every
 ∈ Γ, P∈ (Γ) = ();
- fair if for every graph game hΓi on any player set  , for every { } ∈ Γ,
(Γ)− (Γ−) = (Γ)− (Γ−) where Γ− = Γ \ {{ }}.
3 Eﬃciency, fairness and component balancedness
In this note we look for a graph game value that is characterized by eﬃciency, fairness and
a new axiom that we refer to as component balancedness.
Component balancedness (CB) For every graph game hΓi on any player set  , for
every component  ∈ Γ, it holdsP
∈ ((Γ)− ( Γ|))
 =
P
∈
¡(Γ)− ((Γ)Γ|(Γ)¢
 
First, note that this axiom only states a requirement on the payoﬀs when the collec-
tion of components Γ contains at least two elements, otherwise the requirement reduces
to an identity. Further, notice that the games h Γ|i and h(Γ)Γ|(Γ)i are defined
on the reduced player sets , respectively, (Γ). For a component  ∈ Γ, the axiom
compares the payoﬀs that the players of  receive in the game itself to the payoﬀs that
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these players receive in the subgame on . Considering two components  0 ∈ Γ, this
axiom implies that
1

X
∈
((Γ)− ( Γ|)) = 10
X
∈0
((Γ)− (0 Γ|0)) 
meaning that considering only the players in component , the change in the average
payoﬀ of the players in this component is the same as the change in the average payoﬀ
of the players in any other component  0 resulting from considering only the players in
that component  0. We refer to this axiom as component balancedness because it has
some flavour of the balanced contributions1 property of Myerson [8], but in terms of the
average change of payoﬀs in components.2 Component balancedness also can be seen as a
weak version of component eﬃciency since every graph game value that satisfies component
eﬃciency satisfies component balancedness. This follows straightforward since component
eﬃciency implies that P∈ (Γ) =P∈ ( Γ|) = (), for all  ∈ Γ.
As mentioned, we will show that there is a unique graph game value that satisfies
eﬃciency, fairness and component balancedness. This solution is obtained by taking the
Shapley value of a slight modification of the restricted game Γ. If we want to obtain an
eﬃcient graph game value as the Shapley value of some restricted game, then at least the
worth of the ‘grand coalition’  in the restricted game must be (). It turns out that
this modification is suﬃcient to obtain the unique graph game value satisfying eﬃciency,
fairness and component balancedness. So, for a player set  ⊂ IN and hΓi ∈ G×L ,
we define Γ ∈ G by3
Γ() =
( Γ()  $ 
()  = 
and consider the graph game value  given by
(Γ) = (Γ) for all hΓi ∈ G×L and every  ⊂ IN
We then have the following theorem.
1Balanced contributions for communication graph games states that isolating a player, say , in the
communication structure has the same eﬀect on the payoﬀs of another player, say , as the eﬀect on the
payoﬀ of  as a result of isolating player , i.e., for every graph game hΓi and   ∈  , it holds that
(Γ)− (Γ \ Γ) = (Γ)− (Γ \ Γ), where Γ = {{ } ∈ Γ |  ∈ { }}.
2It is worth remarking that component balancedness also has the flavor of several other known types
of axioms such as consistency (looking at reduced games, but not saying that the payoﬀs of remaining
players do not change) or component fairness (comparing average changes of payoﬀs in a component, but
not after link deletion).
3So, Γ is the Myerson restricted game, except that Γ() = () instead of P∈Γ ().
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Theorem 3.1 The graph game value  is eﬃcient, fair and satisfies component balanced-
ness.
Proof. Since Γ() = (), eﬃciency follows by eﬃciency of the Shapley value. So,
we only have to show fairness and component balancedness. By definition we have that
Γ = Γ + , where  ∈ G is given by
() =
(
0  $ 
()− Γ()  = 
i.e., game Γ is obtained by adding ()− Γ() times the unanimity game4 of  to the
Myerson restricted game Γ. From this and the additivity and symmetry properties of the
Shapley value it follows that
(Γ) = (Γ) = (Γ) + () = (Γ) + ()− 
Γ()
  (3.1)
where the last equality follows by definition of  and . Hence,
(Γ)− (Γ−) = (Γ) + ()− 
Γ()
 −
µ
(Γ−) + ()− 
Γ−()

¶
= (Γ)− (Γ−)− 
Γ()− Γ−()

= (Γ)− (Γ−)− 
Γ()− Γ−
 = (Γ)− (Γ−)
where the third equality follows by fairness of . Hence,  satisfies fairness.
To show component balancedness, by (3.1) we obtain for every  ∈ Γ thatX
∈
(Γ) =
X
∈
(Γ) + 
¡()− Γ()¢ 
Further,
P
∈ (Γ) = () because of component eﬃciency of the Myerson value, and
the total payoﬀ that  assigns to the players in  in the subgame h Γ|i is equal to
() because of the eﬃciency of  itself. Thus, with (3.1)X
∈
((Γ)− ( Γ|)) = () + 
¡()− Γ()¢− () =  ¡()− Γ()¢ 
Also, by eﬃciency of  we have P∈ ((Γ)Γ(Γ)) = P∈ΓP∈ ( Γ|) =P
∈Γ (), and thusX
∈
¡(Γ)− ((Γ)Γ(Γ))¢ = ()− X
∈Γ
() = ()− Γ()
4It is well known from [9] that the collection of unanimity games {}⊆ 6=∅ , defined as  () = 1 if
 ⊆ , and  () = 0 otherwise, form a basis in G in the sense that every  ∈ G can be written as a
unique linear combination of unanimity games, where the coeﬃcients are the Harsanyi dividends, see [3].
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Hence,  satisfies component balancedness. 2
Note that (3.1) gives an alternative definition of the graph game value  assigning
to every graph game its Myerson value and distributing the diﬀerence between the worth
of the ‘grand coalition’  and the sum of the worths of all components equally over all
players. In this sense the solution  can be seen as combining elements of the Shapley
value and equal division solution.5 The next theorem characterizes the graph game value
.
Theorem 3.2 There is a unique graph game value  satisfying eﬃciency, fairness and
component balancedness.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 we only need to show uniqueness. We first consider the case that
Γ is the empty graph. Then Γ = {{}| ∈ }, i.e., every node is a singleton component,
and component balancedness requires for every  ∈  that
(Γ)− ({}Γ|{}) = 1
X
∈
¡(Γ)− ({}Γ|{})¢  (3.2)
By eﬃciency P∈ (Γ) = () and also for every  ∈  , ({}Γ|{}) = ({}).
Hence, when Γ is the empty graph, then by (3.2) the payoﬀs
(Γ) = ({}) + 1
Ã
()−X
∈
({})
!
  ∈  (3.3)
are uniquely determined.
We now proceed by induction similar as in [7], but replacing component eﬃciency
by eﬃciency and component balancedness. Consider graph game hΓi ∈ G×L , and
suppose that we determined the payoﬀs for every h0Γ0i ∈ ∪⊆ G×L with |Γ0|  |Γ|.
Eﬃciency requires thatX
∈
(Γ) = () (3.4)
Further, for a component  ∈ Γ, component balancedness implies thatP
∈ ((Γ)− ( Γ|))
 =
P
∈
¡(Γ)− ((Γ)Γ|(Γ)¢
  (3.5)
5This idea is similar to Kamijo [5] who introduced a solution for games in coalition structure, i.e., the
player set is partitioned into unions, that allocates to every player its Shapley value in the game restricted
to its own union and distributes the Shapley value of its union in the (quotient) game between the unions
equally among the players in each union. Considering the associated communication graph, being the
graph where there is a link between any pair of players in the same union and no links between players in
diﬀerent unions, the unions are exactly the components in that communication graph.
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When  =  , this is an identity and the equation is redundant. Otherwise, eﬃciency
requires that for every  ∈ Γ,X
∈
( Γ|) = () (3.6)
Using the equations (3.4) and (3.6), equation (3.5) reduces to
X
∈
(Γ)− () = 
⎛
⎝()− X
∈Γ
()
⎞
⎠  (3.7)
Let  = |Γ| be the number of components. Since summing up the equations (3.5) over
all components yields an identity, the number of independent equations (3.7) is − 1. So,
equations (3.4) and (3.7) yield together  independent linear equations.
Next, let Γ0 be a spanning subforest of Γ, i.e., Γ0 ⊆ Γ with |Γ0| =  − , and
Γ0 = Γ (both forests have the same collection of components). Note that for every
link { } ∈ Γ0 it holds that |Γ0−|  |Γ0| (deleting any link from Γ0 increases the
number of components). For every link { } ∈ Γ0, by fairness it holds that
(Γ)− (Γ−) = (Γ)− (Γ−) (3.8)
Since |Γ−| = |Γ| − 1, for every { } ∈ Γ0 all values (Γ−),  ∈  , have been
determined by the induction hypothesis. Then (3.8) yields  −  linearly independent
equations. So, together the system of equations (3.4), (3.7) and (3.8) yield 1 + (− 1) +
(−) =  linearly independent equations in  unknown payoﬀs (Γ),  ∈  , and so
all payoﬀs (Γ),  ∈  , are uniquely determined. 2
Notice from equation (3.3) that the solution  divides the excess ()−P∈ ({})
equally among the players when the graph is empty, and thus yields the equal surplus
division solution. On the other hand, when the graph is complete the solution  gives the
Shapley value of .
For the example given in the introduction we have ({}) = 0,  = ,
({}) = 3, ({}) = 2, ({}) = 4, () = 12 and Γ = {{}}. So
Γ = {{} {}}. The Shapley value of  is eﬃcient and yields () = (31
2
 41
2
 4),
and the Myerson value is component eﬃcient and yields (Γ) = (3
2
 3
2
 0). The new so-
lution is eﬃcient and yields (Γ) = (41
2
 41
2
 3). Of course, eﬃciency requires that the
total budget of 12 is allocated. Since all singleton worths are zero, fairness implies that
the link between A and B gives them an equal payoﬀ in this example6. So, we only need
6This follows since, as mentioned before, eﬃciency and component balancedness imply equal surplus
division (every player gets its singleton worth and the remainder is equally distributed over all players) for
the empty graph.
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to determine the shares in the total budget of C compared to A and B together. This is
done by component balancedness which requires that the total payoﬀ of A and B together
minus their worth (being equal to 3) is twice the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of C and
its worth, implying that A and B together get a fraction 2
3
and C gets a fraction 1
3
of
the ‘surplus’ 12 − 3 = 9. As can be seen in this example, our solution favors cooperation
among players since the stand alone player C gets less than one third of the budget. The
outcome of Casajus’ value for this example is (31
4
 41
4
 41
2
), and thus the stand alone player
C gets more than one third of the budget. This occurs because this solution favors (non
cooperative) stand alone players.
Finally, we show logical independence of the axioms of Theorem 3.2. First, the
Myerson value is fair and satisfies component balancedness (there is zero excess to divide
among the components), but is not eﬃcient. Second, the equal division solution given
by (Γ) = ()| | ,  ∈  , hΓi ∈ G ×L   ⊂ IN, is eﬃcient and fair, but is
not component balanced. Third, the component-wise equal division solution given by
(Γ) = ((Γ))|(Γ)| + 1
³
()−P∈Γ ()´,  ∈  , hΓi ∈ G×L   ⊂ IN, is
eﬃcient and component balanced, but not fair.
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